




Number 3Jack H. Beebe*
Since the early 1970s, economic risk-as ret1ect-
ed in uncertainty regarding real output, earnings,
int1ation, and interest rates-has been a major con-
cern to corporate managers, investors, and policy
makers. The banking sector has been no exception.
In their role as intermediaries, bankers continually
have had to monitor and manage risks due to unan-
ticipated changes in int1ation and interest rates,
defaults, and liquidity. Bank risk has also been of
particular importance to insuring agencies and bank
regulators.
In structuring their portfolios, bank managers
explicitly or implicitly, choose their risk exposure
(an ex ante choice) with the expectation ofearning
a return commensurate with the expected risk. Cur-
rent finance theory suggests that investors in debt
and equity markets do not impose a uniquely opti-
mal level of capital risk on individual banks or on
the banking system because investors in capital
markets can manage the risk oftheir total wealth by
diversifying their portfolios. 1 Regulators also have
no way of determining what level of bank risk is
optimal. Thus, one cannot make judgmental state-
ments about the level ofrisk observed.
However, bankers, investors, and regulators
have a keen interest in knowing whether bank capi-
tal is perceived to have become more or less risky.
For example, regulators become concerned when
bank risk is increasing because the adverse conse-
quences of bank failures may extend well beyond
the losses to bank capital investors. At a minimum,
non-insured depositors and insuring agencies bear
some of the risk. But because ofexternalities asso-
ciated with successive collapses in wealth or pos-
sible "runs" by non-insured depositors, the failure
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of one institution may increase the risk of other
institutions. In the extreme, systematic failure can
even affect the macroeconomic performance of the
economy.
Beginning roughly in late 1979, a number of
major developments had the potential of changing
the perceived risk ofbank capital. During 1979, the
int1ation rate accelerated sharply, putting upward
pressure on market interest rates. By Octoberofthat
year, the Federal Reserve had changed its monetary
operating procedures by placing greater emphasis
on controlling the quantity ofmoney while allowing
the federal funds rate to t1uctuate overa wider range
in the short run. Coinciding with the new operating
procedure was a substantial increase in the volatility
of market interest rates. Upward pressure on the
level of interest rates also mounted with the pros-
pect of chronic federal government deficits and
monetary restraint.
In the latter halfof 1979, momentum was build-
ing in Washington for landmark legislation to
deregulate banks. By March 1980, Congress had
passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, which, among other things,
called for the removal of deposit-rate ceilings at
banks~nd thrifts by 1986 and extended deposit
insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 per aCCOUnt.
From March through July of 1980, the Federal
Reserve also imposed the Credit Control Program,
which was directed largely at constraining the
growth of bank credit. These developments taken
together set the stage for what could have been
perceived as a significant change in bank risk.
The purpose of this paper is to compare actual
market measures of bank capital (debt and equity)
risk in the pre- and post-October 1979 periods.
2 The
paper examines whether or not there was a signifi-
cant change in measured bank capital risk in the
post-late-1979 era of monetary and fiscal policy
uncertainty, interest-rate volatility and pendingdeposit-rate volatility. But because of the many
factors affecting the market's perception of bank
capital risk, neitherthe individual influences northe
extent to which a change in risk might have been
due to government protection or increased deposit
insurance can be determined.
J
In summarizing the evidence comparing risk in
the pre- and post-late-1979 periods, the picture is
encouraging. For the latter period as a whole, there
is no evidence ofa significant rise in capital risk of
banks with over $1 billion in assets. Measures of
total capital risk changed little between periods,
while the sensitivity ofbank equity to overall stock-
market risk actually declined between the two peri-
odsJor most banks. (The decline was statistically
significant for the group oflargest banks-over$10
billion in assets.) On the whole, the largest banks
reduced the risk exposures of their equities·(elas-
ticity of returns with respect to general stock price
movements) far more than did the banks in the
smaller groups ($1-5 billion and $5-10 billion).4
This paper is divided into three sections. In Sec-
tion I, the theoretical underpinnings of the various
measures ofbank risk and the possible effects ofthe
post-1979 economic and regulatory environment on
bank risk are discussed. In Section II, the empirical
evidence is presented. In Section III, conclusions
are drawn.
I. Hypotheses of Bank Risk
In observing the capital risk ofbanks, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the sensitivity of bank
capital risk to overall capital risk in the stock and
bond markets (primarily a concept of ex ante risk
posturing) and the actual level of bank capital risk
observed (an ex post measure). For example, eco-
nomic risk, as it impacts on earnings and interest
rates, will affect capital values in the overall stock
and bond markets. One question to be addressed is
whether banks have positioned their portfolios,
operations, andcapital leverages to make theircapi-
tal relatively sensitive or insensitive to such eco-
nomic risks.
The single-index market model from the finance
literature postulates that capital risk sensitivity can
be represented by the equity "beta," or the mea-
sured sensitivity ofthe firm's (or portfolio's) equity
return with respect to the return on the market bun-
dle ofrisky assets, usually proxied by the return on
a broad stock market index (originally, Sharpe,
1963). Precisely because it is measured in relation
to a broad index of risky assets, beta represents
sensitivity to commonly experienced, ornon-diver-
sifiable risk, and assets with a high beta should earn
a return premium in the capital markets (originally,
Sharpe, 1964).
The single-index model has since been extended
to various multi-index models. One extension uses
a two-index model in which the two indices are
returns on a broad index of common stocks (e.g.,
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the S&P500) and returns on an index ofdefault-free
debt instruments (e.g., Treasury issues). The first
index represents "non-diversifiable risk," which
includes the risk associated with all factors that
affect the stock market, such as expected earnings,
interest rates, inflation, defaults, and so forth.
(Since interest rates comprise one factor affecting
the stock market, the two indices obviously are not
independent.)
Bank equity is sensitive to all ofthe factors that
affect the stock market, including interest rates. For
example, banks are sensitive to "earnings risk"
through possible defaults on their loans and invest-
ments, changes in loan demand, and potential vari-
ability in growthand profitability oftheirown (non-
portfolio) operations. Bank portfolio returns also
are subject to (nominal) interest rate risk because
banks carry assets and liabilities that are usually
contracted in nominal dollars and which normally
differ in duration.s Bank equity values are serlsltlve
also to interest rate risk because the real interest rate
affects the discountingoffuture earnings. The qu~s­
tion to be addressed is whetherbanks are positioned
in such a way that theircapital is relatively exposed
to or insulated from the economy-wide sources of
risk that are reflected in overall stock and bond
market volatilities.
In this paper, risk sensitivity is measured in sev-
eral ways: (I) by estimating the bank stock beta,
which measures sensitivity to all commonly experi-enced non-diversifiable risk factors as they affect
the S&P 500; (2) by estimating the sensitivity of
bank stock returns to returns on I-year Treasury
bills (i.e., interest rate risk); and (3) by measuring
whether bank stocks are responsive to Treasury bill
returns beyond the sensitivity to interest rates al-
ready reflected in movements of the overall stock
market (S&P 500).
While a bank may attempt to posture its risk
sensitivity through discretionary a priori portfolio
and operational policies, the risk inherent in the
economic environment will determine how these
policies translate into ex post measures of actual
capital risk. For example, a bank could attempt to
insulate itself ex ante from risk, but if total risk in
the market were to rise, the bank's ex post capital
risk actually could increase. Thus, the analysis ex-
amines not only the elasticities (sensitivities) ofthe
prices of bank equities with respect to stock and
T-bill prices, but also direct measures ofbank-debt
risk premia, bank equity returns, and the dispersion
ofthose returns. These measures represent actual ex
postbank risk as opposed to exante risk posturing.
Several forces in the post-1979 environment
might have affected the capital risk of banks: (I)
During 1979 and early 1980, there was a rapid
acceleration in the rate of inflation and in the level
of interest rates while the economy was operating
roughly at capacity. Such developments in the past
often have been followed by recessions. (2) In Oc-
tober 1979 the Federal Reserve changed its short-
term operating procedure for monetary policy. (3)
Beginning in late 1979, legislation (of unknown
specifics at the time) to deregulate banks was be-
coming increasingly imminent, and resulted in the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of March 1980. (4) Credit controls
were imposed during the March-July period in
1980, and their possible re~imposition must have
presented some continued threat to the efficient
operation of financial institutions. (5) Finally, the
monetary-fiscal policy dilemma caused by tax
changes andthe prospect ofchronic federal deficits
began to surface in 1980 and 1981.
Itis very difficult to sayapriorihow these events
should have affected bank risk. For example, one
cannot say unequivocally whether the Federal Re-
serve's change in operating policy should have
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diminished or increased either interest rate or real
earnings risk. From a monetarist point ofview, the
short run variability of the federal funds rate and
perhaps even otherinterest rates, economic activity,
and real earnings might have increased, while the
risk ofmajor fluctuations would have abated. From
a Keynesian pointofview, variability ofmost inter-
est rates, and perhaps real earnings, might have
increased even in the longer run.
It is difficult to predict how deregulating con-
sumer deposit ceilings also might have affected
bank risk'" Ignoring the effect ofdeposit insurance
for the moment, it is likely that removing consumer
deposit ceilings might actually reduce bank risk in
the long run because the shift from non-interest to
interest payments on deposits presumably would
enable a bank to shift from quasi-fixed factors of
production-buildings and other convenience or
nonprice concessions-to highly flexible factors-
interest payments (Mingo, 1978 and Quick 1977).
While the deregulation ofconsumerdeposit ceil-
ings might have some effect in reducing bank risk
by affording banks a more efficient and flexible
means of attracting deposits, it might also increase
the desired risk exposure ofbanks by increasing the
likelihood that marginal liabilities would fall under
the umbrella of deposit insurance. As a conse-
quence of consumer deposit-rate deregulation,
banks are freer to bid up the rates on insureddepos-
its of up to $100,000 denomination. If marginal
bank liabilities shift from non-insured to insured
sources, the discipline imposed by lenders (i.e.,
depositors) is lessened. The deregulation of (in-
sured) consumer deposits might then tend to in-
crease the optimal ex ante risk exposure ofa bank.
In part because there is no necessarily optimal
level ofrisk for bank capital and in part because the
several factors in the post-1979 environment might
have either increased or decreased bank risk to
varying degrees, any change in observed bank risk
is simply an empirical question. The author's a
priori expectation was that large banks probably
attemptedto reduce the exante exposures (sensitivi-
ties) of their capital to interest-rate and economic
risk after the mid-1970s (Beebe, 1977).7 The actual
ex post risk to be observed in the post-1979 period
was an open question.II. Evidence of Risk
Month-end closing prices of common equity
were obtained from Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) for
91 large bank holding companies and banks (hence-
forth referred to as "banks") ranging in total assets
(year-end 1981) from $1 billion to $121 billion. The
choice of institutions was based on the availability
of stock data that indicated frequent tradingx: 52
banks had assets of $1-5 billion, 19 had assets of
$5-10 billion, and 20 had assets of$IO-121 billion.
Secondary-marketmonth-end quoted yields were
obtained for 15 debt issues of 15 different bank
holding companies and banks.
q The institutions
associated with the 15 issues ranged in size from
$1.7 billion to $121 billion, with 8 in the $1-5 billion
group, 2 in the $5-10 billion group, and 5 in the
$10+ billion group.
In the following analysis, evidence on bank debt
and equity ex post capital risk is presented first
(Charts I and 2 on debt and Tables I and 2 on
equity). Then the more complex regression analysis
ofex ante risk posturing follows (Tables 3-5).
Debt Risk
Chart I shows the risk premia for Moody's Baa
bonds and for an equally weighted index of the
fifteen bank debt issues, both relative to Aaa cor-
porate issues. Hi Throughout most of the 1974-79
period, the bank bonds on average were considered
by the market to be about as risky as Baa bonds.
Chart 1
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Aaa and Baa yields are end-of-month. Bank bond index is an
equally weighted end-of-month yield offifteen major bank debt
issues.
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However, during the post-1979 period, the bank
bonds were considered to be less risky than Baa's.
In fact, the post-1979 period shows very little in-
crease in the average risk premium for these 15 bank
debt issues, with the exceptionofthe CreditControl
period (March-July, 1980) and possibly a small
increase in 1982.
Chart 2 reports the cross-sectional coefficient of
variation of yields within the 15-bank-bond index.
(The coefficient of variation is the standard devia-
tion divided by the mean. It measures the extent to
which the risk premia differ across the fifteen
banks.) Interestingly, the cross-section dispersion
of yields increased markedly immediately after
October 1979 and through the CreditControl period
when the cross-sectional dispersion reached its high
1975 level. After the Credit Control period, how-
ever, the dispersion ofbank yields (risk premia) has
remained well below thatofthe turbulent 1974-1976
period.
Charts I and 2 taken together indicate that, since
1979, bank-debt risk premia (for these 15 large
banks) have neither risen significantly on average
nor become more dispersed across the banks, ex-
cept during the period ofCredit Controls. One may
conelude, then, that these bank debt issues have not
been viewed as becoming more risky in the post-
1979 period.
Chart 2
Dispersion of Bank Debt Yields
About Their Monthly Means
Monthly cross-section coefficient of variation (standard devia-
tion divided by mean) ofmonth-end yields for fifteen majorbank
debt issues.Equity Returns
Table I shows. equity returns (excluding divi-
dends) for the pre-and post-1979 periods. I I In the
1972-79 period, bankequity returns were very close
to those on the S&P 500, although the large-bank
grollp p!3rf0nn!3drnoderatelybett!3r than the small-
bank group. 12 In the post-I979 period, the group of
$1-5 billion banks performed considerably better
than theS&P 5pO, and the two groups of larger
banks, considerably poorer. But within the post-
1979 period, there was adistinct break in stockprice
behavior, with a persistentdecline in the.stock mar-
ket beginning in December 1981 and continuing
throughout the sample period. The two groups of
large banks registered a decline in stock prices that
was much more severe than that ofthe S&P 500, an
indication that the market might have reassessed the
expected earnings ofthe largest banks beginning in
late 1981.
Equity Risk
The standard deviation of equity returns over a
period of time is commonly used as a measure
ofequity (total) risk. Table 2 presents standard
deviations of monthly equity returns (excluding
dividends) for the bank groups for the pre- and
post-1979 periods. Between the two periods, the
standard deviation ofequity returns declined for all
three groups ofbanks. The decline was greatest for
the group of largest banks; for this group, the stan-
dard deviation declined even in comparison to that
of the S&P 500.
13 The table indicates that the total
equity risk ofthe largest banks declined bothabso-
lutely and relatively in the post-1979 period. As
indicated by the regression results reported below,
this lower risk can be interpreted in part as the
consequence of discretionary policies taken by the



































I Monthly percentage returns are calculated for each bank over the period. Equally-weighted cross-section average returns are calculated
for each group ofbanks. Geometric mean returns for the group indices are then calculated for the sample periods.
Table 2
Bank Equity Risk





















IStandard deviations ofmonthly percentage returns (at monthly rates) are calculated for each bank over the period. Period averages are
then calculated using equal weights foreach bank in the group. Returns exclude dividends.






The above measures of ex post debt and equity
risk are the combinedconsequence ofrisk posturing
by banks and total risk in the stock and bond mar-
kets. The risk sensitivity measures reported below,
although measured on an ex post basis, are inter-
preted~as exposures to total risk, and hence the
result ofexante risk posturing. (As noted later, one
could argue also that they are the consequences of
impliedregulatory protection.)
As describedearlier, the single-index stock mar-
ket model employs the equity beta as a measure of
non~diversifiable,or market-related, risk. Specif-
ically, beta is a measure of the elasticity of equity
prices with respect to the price ofthe market basket
of risky assets, normally proxied by the stock mar-
ket (here by the S&P500, exclusive ofdividends).I"
Because it is a measure ofsensitivity to non-diversi-
fiable risk factors, the magnitude of beta can be
interpreted as being the consequence of ex ante
discretionary policies employed to manage capital
risk.
For the individual bank, the single-index stock
market model for the full sample period with a shift
in beta at 1979: 10 is as follows:
BK =a+f3SP +f3(SP xO)+e (I)
t t s t I
where
BK = monthly stock price percentage retum(ex-
, c1uding dividends) for the individual bank
(closing prices for the last trading day ofthe
month)
monthly percentage return (excluding divi-
dends) on the S&P 500 (closing prices for
the last trading day ofthe month)
"excess return," excluding dividends for
the periodil1 question-i.e., in excess of
the return earned for taking on non-diversi-
fiable risk, as measured through beta
the elasticity of bank-stock prices with re-
spect to the S&P 500
f3, = shift in,13 at 1979:10
o 0, I dummy to estimate the shift in f3 (0 = I
for the second subperiod) 15
standard error, interpreted as nonmarket-
related, or residual, risk
Equation (I) was estimated separately for each of
the 91 banks.
lo The individual bank results were
then summarized in Table 3 by reporting the median
values of the parameter estimates, t-statistics and
regression statistics for (I) all 91 banks, (2) the 52
banks in the $1-5 billion size class, (3) the 19 banks
in the $5-10 billion size class, and (4) the 20 banks
in the $10+ billion size class. In addition, the per-
centagesofsignificantt-statistics are reported along
with median- t-values.
Table 3
Bank Equity Risk Related to the S&P 500
(Median Values ofIndividual-Bank Regressions-
















































Subscripts rcfer to pre- and post-1979: 10. Figures in parentheses are median t-statistics (against the null hypotheses that the coefficients
are zero) and percentages of individual t-statistics that exceed the 5-percent cntlcal level usmg a one-tailed test (two-tailed tor
a)-t-critical 1.66 for one-tailed tests.
IUnits are monthly percentage changes. nonannualized.
"Elasticity ofbank-stock price with respect to the price ofthe S&P 500. .... .
'Because the values reported are group medians. the reported shift coefficientsdo not necessanlyequal the dltterences between the penod
coefficients.
12Theregressionfor sensitivity to interest rate risk
IS:
BK monthly stock price percentage return ,
the individual.banks (closing prices for the
last trading day ofthe month)
TB, = monthly percent<\geretumon I-year Trea-
sury bills for the holding period from the
first to.the.second month of the life of the
T-bill (calculated from closingyields on the
last trading day ofthe month)'x
a = average elasticity-adjusted return differen-
tial, excluding bank dividends, bet\\ieen
T-bills and bank stocks
y = elasticity ofbank-equity prices with respect
to the price of I-yearTreasury bills
y, = shift in y at 1979: 10
D = 0, I dummy to estimate the shift in y (D=1
for the second subperiod)
e, = standard error ofthe regression
The results for beta are quite striking. Beta was
higher for the largestbanks than for the other banks
in the first subperiod. By the second period, beta
was actually lower for the largest banks than for the
smaller banks, and for the largest banks its decline
betweensubperiods .was statistically· significant.
(For the shift coefficient, the mediant-value was
-1.74comparedwith a critical value of---I .66, and
55% of the individual t-values were significant.)
This evidence is consistent withthe hypothesis that
the largest banks (over $10 billion in assets) pos-
tured their portfolios to insulate their capital from
non-diversifiable, or market-related, risk.'7
The estimate of beta conveys the sensitivity of
bank-stock prices to real economic activity, interest
rates and all other "common factors" that impinge
on equity prices. The fact that such factors are
numerous, complex, and correlated-and that we
do not have a reliable structural model to sort them
out-means that we cannot identify the individual
factors that explain beta. However, we can examine
the sensitivity ofbank equity capital to interest-rate
risk. Tables 4 and 5 present these results.
where
BK, + yTB, + y, (TB, x D) + e, (2)
Table 4
Bank Equity Risk Related 1-Year Treasury Bills
(Median Values ofIndividual-Bank Regrcssions-
1972:08-1982:07. with Dummy Shifts at 1979: 10)
a' y shiftJ R2
All Banks -1.64 2.95 1.99 .88 .05
(-1.62:44%) (1.84;58%) (2.40:88%) (-.60:12%)
$1-5 billion 1.38 2.18 1.95 .37 .04
( 1.36:290/.:) (1.36:42%) (2.39;87%) (-.25: 0%)
$5-10 billion 1.91 3.95 2.06 -1.58 06
(-1.70:58%) (2.18;74%) (2.63:89%) (-1.17;32%)
$10+ billion -1.93 3.61 1.92 --1.86 .05
(-1.97;70%) (2.42;85%) (2.28;90%) (.---1.18;25%)








Subscripts refer to pre- and post-1979:IO. Figures in parentheses are median t-statistics (against the null hypotheses that the coefficients
are zero) and percentages of individual t-statistics that exceed the 5-percent critical level using a one-tailed test (two-tailed for
a)__t-criticaJ = 1.66 for one-tailed tests.
'Units are monthJypercentage changes, nonannualized.
2ElastiCity ofbank-stock prices with respect to the price ofthe S&P500.
JBecause the valuesreported are groupmedians, the reported shiticoefficientsdo not necessarily equal the differences between the period
coefficients.
4Estimates reported are for a single regression on the index for the S&P500, and thus are not median values.
13where the variables are defined as before.
Equation (3) postulates a two-factor market
model in which bank stock prices are related not
only to "common factors" as reflected in the S&P
500 but also to an additional ..interest rate" factor
beyond that already reflected in the S&P 500. Al-
though multi-index models often are estimated by
first orthogonalizing the right-hand variables rela-
tive to one another, this method causes an unjustifi-
able upward bias in the t-statistics and, therefore,
the method ofordinary least squares is used in this
paperY (As suggested by the low R' of .05 in
the bottom row of Table 4, multi-collinearity be-
tween SP and TB should not present an estimation
problem).
The results reported in Table 5 help to coflfitm the
implication that arises from comparing the bank
stock results of Table 4 with the S&P 500 results:
that the interest rate effect on bank stock pric~s is
not very different from the general effect ofinterest
rates on common stocks. Although y in Table 5 is
sensitivity for the S&P 500 between the two sub-
periods is perplexing. Since equity valuation ought
to be sensitive generally to changes in the real
interest rate, two possible explanations come to
mind. Either there was a structural shift in the way
the market evaluated the effect of real interest rate
changes on the present value ofequities after 1979.
orthe market attributed a larger proportion ofnomi-
nal interest rate volatility after 1979 to changes in
the inflation premium. Although some research has
concluded that variability of inflation premia has
caused much of the variability in debt yields since
October 1979, other research disagrees. The down-
ward shift in the S&P 500's sensitivity to interest
rates requires further study.'!
In light ofthe results for the S&P 500 in Table 4,
it is possible that much of the response of bank
stocks to interest rates is felt through a change in
the discount rate applied to the expected dividend
stream rather than through any specific effect of
interest rates on banks' portfolios. To test this hy-
pothesis, the right-hand variables for returns on the
S&P 500 and I-year T-bills were entered simulta-
neously within a single regression:
Equation (2) postulates that bank stock prices are
affected by T-bill prices (i.e., the inverse ofinterest
rates) with a possible change in the elasticity at
October 1979. In equation (2), BK and TB are
monthly holding-period returns on bank stocks and
I-year Treasury bills, respectively. For debt instru-
ments, holding-period returns are inversely corre-
lated with interest rates (yields). Since stock prices
generally are inversely correlated with interest rates
(yields), we should expect stock prices to be posi-
tively correlated with returns on debt instruments
(i.e., the sign on y is expected to be positive.)
Treasury bills are used as the representative debt
instrument because they are default-free and are
pure discount instruments (that is, they bear no
coupons), and hence, have a constant duration re-
gardless ofthe level ofinterest rates.!9
In Table 4, results from equation (2) are pre-
sented for the 91 individual banks and for the S&P
500. These results show that interest rates have a
significant effect on the equity prices of banks and
the S&P 500 in both periods. For the bank stocks,
interest rate sensitivities do not increase in the post-
1979 period, and tend to decrease for some of the
banks in the two larger size groups. (The R' is
surprisingly small for all regressions, however, in-
dicating that interest rates explain only a small por-
tion ofstock-price variance.)
Interest rates ought to affect bank stock returns in
at least two ways. First, if banks make contracts
whose payment streams are fixed in nominal dollars
(e.g.. fixed-rate mortgages), then unexpected
changes in nominal rates should affect the market
value of the bank's portfolio depending upon the
extent to which interest rate risk is more or less
hedged. Second, unexpected changes in the real
interest rate should affect the present value of ex-
pected dividends attributable to taking on risk, gen-
erating information needed for lending, and provid-
ing operational services. The latter effect is similar
to that impacting on all equities, not just bank
stocks, and the extent to which only the real rate
affects equities depends on the extent to which real
corporate earnings are hedged against inflation.
In the bottom line of Table 4, it is apparent that
S&P 500 returns are sensitive to interest rates. The
sensitivities are significant in both periods, and
there is a significant downward shift in the relation-
ship.'o The large downward shift in interest-rate risk
14
BK, IX + ~SP, + ~/SP, x D)
+ yTB, + Ys (TB, x D) + e,
(3)positive in both periods, it is significant only in the
second period. Moreover, its magnitude is reduced
from the estimates in Table 4, and it adds little
explanatory power over the regressions on beta
alone in Table 3.
23 The perplexing behaviorofinter-
est rates in the latter period generally makes it
difficult to speculate on the economic reasoning
behind the results in Table 5.
TableS
Bank Equity Risk Related to the S&P 500 and l-Year Treasury Bills
(Median Values ofIndividual-Bank Regressions-
1972:08-1982:07, with Dummy Shifts at 1979: 10)
a l Yo4 yl4 Yshift
3 R2 D.W. (TI
All Banks -.60 .90 .64 -21 .65 1.39 .65 .29 219 6.50
(-.69;12%) (5.93;100%) (2.55;82%) (-.67;25%) (.53; 9%) (1.94;66%) (.50; 9%)
$1-5 billion -.42 .82 .65 -.13 .31 1.38 1.13 25 2.19 6.63
(-.46;10%) (5.31;100%) (2.46;83%) (-.48;15%) (.22; 2%) (1.91:69%) (.88;12%)
$5-10 billion -82 .88 .80 -.21 1.42 1.43 .10 34 2.17 658
(-.77:21%) (6.05;1()()%) (2.79;89%) (-'.85;16%) (85;21%) (2.01:68%) (.06; 5'7c)
$10+ billion -93 1.13 .54 .58 1.23 129 -.05 .39 2 15 6.21
(-1.03;10%) (7.62;100%) (2.23;75%) (-2.02;60%) (.95;15%) (1.84:55%) (-.03; 5'1< )
-~--~--~_._-~,-""~--~
Subscripts refer to pre- and post-1979:IO. Figures in parentheses are median t-statistics and perccntages of individual t-statistics that
exceed the 5-percentcritical level. (One-tailed tests for negative shift for f3 and positive shift ofy; two-tailed test for a)---t-critical = 1.66
for one-tailed tests.
1Units are monthly percentage changes, nonannuaEzed.
2Elasticity ofbank-stock prices with respect to the price ofthe S&P 500.
3Because the values reported are group medians, the reported shift coefficientsdo not necessarily equal the differences between the period
coefficients.
4Elasticity ofequity prices with repect to the price of I-yearTreasury bills.
III. Summaryand Conclusions
The evidence presented here indicates that the
post-1979 economic and regulatory environment
did not significantly increase the capital risk of
banks (and bank holding companies) with over $1
billion in assets. With the exception of the Credit
Control period (March-July 1980), the risk pre-
mium on debt capital ofthe fifteen institutions rose
very little above. its low level of 1977-79 and re-
mained well below the high debt-risk premiumperi-
odof 1975-76. Moreover, the standarddeviations of
equity returns for the 91 institutions with assets of
$I-121 billion were lower on average in the post-
late-1979 period than in the 1972-1979 comparative
period. For the largest institutions ($10+ billion),
the standard deviation of equity returns even de-
clined in comparison to that ofthe S&P500.
The sensitivity of bank equity to common risk
factors, as measured by the equity beta, also de-
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clined in the post-1979 period compared to the ear-
lier period, and the decline was statistically signifi-
cant for over half of the twenty banks in the $10+
billion size group. Forthe twenty largest banks, the
median beta declined from 1.16 to 0.63. This evi-
dence suggests that investors perceived the capital
of these banks to be more insulated from common
risk factors (economy-wide interest-rate, earnings,
and bankruptcy risk) in the post-1979 period than in
the earlier period.
Although bank equities are sensitive to interest
rates, the sensitivity did not increase in the post-
1979 period, and declined significantly for some of
the banks in the two larger size groups. However,
the general stock market sensitivity to interest rates
declined significantly, and by a comparatively
greater amount. After taking account ofthe change
in general sensitivity ofthe stock market to interestrate volatility, as retlected in beta, the specific
sensitivity of bank stocks to interest rates was
reduced considerably, and was statistically signif-
icant only in the post-1979 period. Given the per-
plexing behavior of interest rates in the latter
period, it is difficult to draw finn conclusions re-
garding changes in the effect of interest rates on
bank stock prices.
The post-late-1979 period is regarded generally
as having been a turbulent period for intlation,
economic activity, interest rates, and banking de-
regulation. The evidence of stable capital risk for
banks of over $1 billion in assets (and declining
betas for the $10+ billion banks) is encouraging,
although not necessarily surprising in view of the
fact that banks with assets over $1 billion are re-
garded generally as being relatively well-insulated
from interest rate risk and the adverse consequences
ofderegulation.
The result could be attributed to investor percep-
tions that regulators (particularly the insuring
agency) and legislators increasingly protected the
capital holders of large banks, or to discretionary
policies by the managements of these banks to re-
duce the risk of their capital by altering their port-
folios, operations, and capital leverages. Although
one cannot detennine from the data whether the
relative stability of bank capital risk is due to per-
ceived regulatory protection or discretionary poli-
cies by bankers, the author is inclined to suspect the
latter (Beebe, 1977).
FOOTNOTES
1. Because investors in capital markets can manage the
risk of their total wealth by diversifying their portfolios, the
capital markets do not dictate a unique set of preferences,
and hence an optimal level of risk, vis-a-vis any single
investment or group of investments such as bank debt or
equity.
2. The data end in JUly 1982 simply because they were
assembled in the Fall of that year. Passage of the Garn-St
Germain Act would not have affected the data, as its pas-
sage was not anticipated piiOi to about September 1982.
3. For example, it is possible that investors simply per-
ceived banks as being more protected by government
policies in the turbulent post-1979 period and hence bank
capital values became less volatile than they otherwise
would have been.
4. The evidence turned up what appears to have been an
increase in bank capital risk beginning in 1982. This devel-
opment is not examined in the paper because the sample
period ends in July 1982. It is the subject of a subsequent
study by the author.
5. See especially Flannery (1981 and 1982) and Flannery
and James (1982 and 1983) on interest rate risk of banks.
The impetus of much of this paper comes from their work.
6. There is a longstanding, albeit unpersuasive, argument
that the removal of deposit ceilings woUld have caused
bankersto preserve earnings spreads by investing in riskier
assets. Benston (1964) calls this postUlated effect the
"profit-target" hypothesis, as opposed to the "profit-
maximum," hypothesis. See Mingo (1978) for adiscussion.
It is unlikely that the profit target hypothesis had merit even
at atime when most orall ofbanks' liabilitieswere subjectto
ceiling rates. Even if deposit ceilings were binding on all
bank liabilities, profit-maximizing banks would raise addi-
tional funds by bidding up the marginal cost of funds to
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market-equivalent yields through non-interest conces-
sions. Deposit ceilings would lower the marginal cost of
funds for profit-maximizing banks only if the ceilings some-
how also lowered the yield on all the non-bank alternatives
available to depositors (both personal and commercial)-
an unlikely prospect.
Particularly in recent years, however, deposit ceilings have
pertained only to some bank liabilities, and banks clearly
havepaid explicit interest at market rates in theunregulated
commercial deposit and non-deposit markets for their mar-
ginal funds. It is difficult, therefore, to argue that removing
deposit ceilings would lead banks into riskier assets, as
removing the ceilings would change only the average cost
of funds, not the marginal cost.
7. In an earlier paper, the author examined the aggregate
bank portfolio over the post-WWII period in an effort to
explain how banks had employed active liability manage-
mentto affect their growth and risk postures (Beebe, 1977).
A clear picture emerged that both growth and non-diversifi-
able risk exposure of large banks accelerated during the
1960s and early 1970s. (The average equity beta of large
banks rose from 0.5 to 1.1 between the late 1950s and early
1970s.) The author postulated that in response to the riskier
economic environmentofthe mid-1970s, largebanks might
reduce their risk exposure. This result is borne out in the
present stUdy, as the beta for banks over $10 billion in
assets declined from 1.2 to 0.6
8. The author thanks Chris James of the University of
Oregon for providing the names of DRI banks with Well-
behaved stock price series. The list of banks in this study
differs from the samples in the various studies done by
Mark Flannery and Chris James. They restricted their sam-
ple to holding companies with identifiable lead banks. The
present study consists of holding companies and banksx 100.
that are listed by Compustat and that have monthly stock
price datadating back to 1972 in the DRI database.
9. Month-end quoted yields were obtained from Moody's
Bond Record, and information on the bonds, from Moody's
Bank and Finance Manual. Reliable datawere available for
only 15 bank holding companies and banks. The bonds
were issued between February 1971 and March 1974. All
had call options after 10 years at par or slightly above, and
all carried. coupons such thatthey initiallysold approximate-
ly at par. Eleven had initial maturities of 25 years and four
had maturities of30 years.
There is a dearth ofregularly traded bank debtissues in the
secondary market. Even for these 15 issues, which
Moody's considered to be frequently traded, statistical
analysis of the monthly returns indicated that the bonds
were not always traded at month-end. Serially correlated
errors in the returns with respect to the returns on broad
bond indices implied average lags ofover a week, a sign of
infrequent trading and/ordatathat are based on bids rather
than actual trades. For this reason, bank bond risk prernia
are reported only in graphical forrn.
10. In Charts 1and 2, risk premia were divided by the level
of interest rates becaUSe the change in yield (or yield differ-
ential) is directly proportional to the level of yields for any
given holding period percentage return.
The increased variance after October 1979 in the Bank/
Aaa differential in Chart 1maybedue to short-run discrep-
ancies caused by infrequent trading of bank bonds during
the period of great day-to-day volatility in bond prices. Aaa
and Baa rates are for the last trading day of the rnonth.
Although reported bank bond rates are also quoted for the
last trading day of the month, statistical tests indicated
infrequent trading throughout the entire sample period, in
that yields lagged behind those of the broad indices (See
footnote 9).
11. Bank equity data are common stock prices as ofclosing
on the last trading day of the month. Monthly percentage
returns are calculated as percentage changes in price.
Returns exclude dividends becausedividend datawere not
available. Lack of dividend data seriously affects calcula-
tions ofaverage returns (as in Table 1) but has little effect on
the measures of the variability of returns used in the regres-
sions and reported in Tables 2-5.
12. Differences in dividend policies are unknown to the
author. Dividend differentials could have a substantial ef-
fect relative to such a small discrepancy.
13. Because the S&P 500 is a portfolio ofdiversified stocks,
its standard deviation understandably is belowthe average
standard deviations of its component issues and of the
individual bank issues. While the absolute level of the bank
standard deviations relative to that of the S&P 500 conveys
no meaning, changes over time are meaningful.
14. Given the wide variations of price returns using monthly
data, omitting dividends affects estimated betas only slight-
ly. Returns are sometimes expressed in excess of the risk-
free rate of return, a nuance that also has little effect on
empirical results. Ideally, in place of the S&P 500, one
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would use returns of a value-weighted index of all risky
assets, inclUding debt and real estate. Such an index does
not exist.
15. Thet-statistics for {3 in the second period ({31 in Table 3)
were obtained by running the same specification, substitut-
ing (0, 1) multiplicative dummies for both of the subperiods.
This technique was used to obtain second-period t-statis-
tics in Tables 4 and 5 also.
16. All of the regressions in the paper (Tables 3-5) were run
with and without the Credit Control period (March-July,
1980). The omission of these months made almost no
perceptible difference, and so the regressions reported in
the paper include the Credit Control period.
17. In work reported earlier, the author argued that such a
shift might occur. (See footnote 7.)
18. TB in equation (2) is the 1-month return on anew 1-year
Treasury bill held for one month only. Month-end effective
yields (not discount yields) are from the DRI-FACS data-
base with back data from Bank of America. The formula
used to convertyields to monthlyreturns at monthly rates is:
[
1 + ~~o] 11/1~1
1 + Yt+1
100
19. It is known that for bonds with fixed coupons, the dura-
tion (the present-value-weighted effective maturity of all the
payments-coupons and principal) varies inversely with
the level of interest rates. This effect would alter a relation-
ship between BK and coupon-bearing bonds, and thus
would make interpretation of y difficult. A T-bill has only a
single payment at maturity and hence its duration is always
its stated maturity, regardless of changes in the level of
rates. The duration of TB at the beginning of each monthly
holding period is a constant value of 12 months, regardless
of the level of interest rates.
20. One hasto take care in interpreting the higher t-statis-
tics and lower standard error for the S&P 500 equation
compared with the individual bank equations in Table 4.
Part of the higher significance results from the fact that the
S&P 500 index represents a diversified portfolio.
21. The perplexing behavior and interpretation of interest
rates in the post-late-1979 period has been explored by
Evans (1981) and others. His study and others do not fully
explain post-1979 interest rate behavior.
22. There are several papers analyzing stock prices using
orthogonalization, or more generally, principal compon-
ents. All are subject to the criticism of overrated signifi-
cance. (For an interpretation of these methods, see Fogler,
John, and Tipton, 1981). Recently, papers by Flannery and
James (1982 and 1983) have found significant effects of
interest rates on bank stock prices. These papers use only
that portion of stock market returns orthogonal to debt
returns in an equation like that of equation (3). The mea-
sured interest rate elasticity is then the total effect (direct
and through the stock market) of the interest rate on bankstocks. Orthogonalizationsidestepsthe factthat SP andTB
are jointly determined in a structural model ofthe economy.
Besides overstating the resulting t-statistics, it ignores pos-
sible structural changes between thesetwo importantmac-
roeconomic, endogenous variables. The significant shift
variable in the S&P 500 equation in the bottom line of Table
4 indicates structural change between interest rates and
the stock market between the two superiods.
23. The R2 values are improvedvery little overthose report-
ed using beta alone (Table 3). F tests on the 91 individual
bank regressions to test the significance of adding the
interest rate parameters-i.e., testing for improved regres-
sion fit for the specification in Table 5 over that in Table
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